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ARTICLES

"IN WHAT VISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION MUST THE LAW BE
COLOR-BLIND?"*
LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE**

My purpose in these brief remarks is not to recapitulate a body
of doctrine whose major trajectory has yet to cross our constitutional
firmament. Nor is it my aim to predict the path that trajectory will
take after the Supreme Court has decided the teacher lay-off' and
firefighter promotion 2 cases from the Sixth Circuit and the union
membership case from the Second Circuit. In this realm, whoever
lives by the crystal ball must learn to eat ground glass, and I would
rather seek more normal nourishment. Besides, we will all know
soon enough4 what the Supreme Court does in those three cases;
5
what the opinions may or may not reveal is why.

With that in mind, my focus today will be on the affirmative
action controversy as a window into the constitutional and judicial
vision - the philosophy of constitutional meaning and judicial role
- of those who deem race-specific preferences for minorities to be
* This essay is essentially transcribed from an address to a Plenary Session of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, May 19, 1986, in Williamsburg,
Virginia.
** Ralph S. Tyler, J., Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). See infra note 4.
2. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063
(1986).
3. Local 28 v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
4. Literally as I was delivering this address, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote,
held that the lay-off provision in the teachers' collective bargaining agreement violated the Equal Protection Clause. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842
(1986).
5. Discussion of the several Wygant opinions, which leave numerous fundamental issues unresolved, is beyond my purpose here. Suffice it to say that, while none of
those opinions proceeds from a premise of extreme constitutional hostility to all racespecific affirmative action, all of the opinions save those of Justices Marshall, id. at
1858 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting), and Stevens,
id. at 1867 (dissenting opinion), leave unanswered the question of why such government programs should ordinarily be viewed as constitutionally suspect.
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presumptively invalid, subject only to a narrow exception for judicial relief to identified victims of proven race discrimination.' I will
call these the "race neutralists." My question is: Why do the race
neutralists set themselves against the view, expressed by Justice
Blackmun in his separate Bakke opinion, that "to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race ... [a]nd ...to treat some
persons equally, we must . . . treat them differently."'7 In other
words, what constitutional sources or theories can the race neutralists invoke?
I.
To begin with, the race neutralists might invoke the notion that
all racial classifications, the supposedly benign no less than the
overtly malign, are "inherently suspect." Now that broad notion itself has a somewhat suspect source: it was given its first explicit articulation in the justly infamous 1944 decision - Korematsu v.
United Statess - upholding our government's forced relocation of
Japanese-American citizens to concentration camps. Before announcing its result in Korematsu, the Supreme Court proclaimed
that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect ....Courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny." It is noteworthy that the Court was
speaking there of restricting "civil rights," and not of allocating
state-created opportunities for individual advancement. More important still, even in Korematsu the Supreme Court held that the
point of strict scrutiny for racial classifications is to detect whether
they reflect "[p]ressing public necessity" or merely "racial antagonism." 10 Racial antagonism, of course, is hardly the motive of today's minority set-aside programs.
6. This narrow an exception seems to have been rejected by nearly all the Justices in Wygant. See id. at 1850 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.)
("As part of this nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent
persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy."); id. at 1853
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("the Court has
forged a degree of unanimity.., that a plan need not be limited to the remedying of
specific instances of identified discrimination"); id. at 1863 (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting) ("the scope of [affirmative action] policies
need not be limited to remedying specific instances of identifiable discrimination").
But cf. id.. at 1857 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The discharge of white
teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has been shown to be a victim of any
racial discrimination, is quite a different matter.") (emphasis added).
7. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
separate opinion).
8. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).

10. Id.
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II.
Seeking a sounder source than Korematsu, the race neutralists
often recur to the first Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.1 Indeed, Solicitor General Charles Fried's argument in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education leans heavily on Plessy."2 The Solicitor General says: "Whether a Plessy is ejected from a railroad coach
because he is one-eighth black or laid-off because he is seven-eighths
white, the concrete wrong to him is much the same."' 8 That may
seem counterintuitive, however. For those "wrongs" are not self-evidently the same: the actual wrong to Mr. Plessy was a denigration of
his mortal worth, a perpetuation of slavery, and a reinforcement of
his political exclusion; none of this, certainly, can be said of the hypothesized converse harm. Nonetheless, the race neutralists always
offer the obligatory quotation from Justice Harlan: "Our Constitution is color-blind.""' Those who quote the elder Justice Harlan with
such abandon should consider the context of the preceding five
sentences in that justly famous dissent:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind .... "
Perhaps it is anachronistic and even unfair to stress too heavily the
manifest racism in Justice Harlan's full statement.16 But even for
this late nineteenth-century proponent of white dominance, the
color-blind ideal, it turns out, was only shorthand for the concept
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents our law from enshrining
and perpetuating white supremacy. To say that this particular vice
is shared, automatically or presumptively, by race-specific minority
set-asides strikes many as far-fetched.
So the question remains unanswered: Why would anyone equate
laying off a white Plessy to make room for a black worker, and ejecting a black Plessy from a railroad coach to maintain white
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Like most Southern gentlemen of the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan-a
former slave owner and originally, an opponent of the Thirteenth Amendment-was
surely a product of his time. See FILLER, John M. Harlan, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1282 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969).
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supremacy?

III.
The race neutralists' reply to that question sometimes involves
a reference to the "original intention" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers.1 7 But that argument faces an enormous stumbling
block. I am not referring to the often-noted historical fact that those
same Framers created a Freedman's Bureau to assist former slaves."
As the Solicitor General has pointed out, those pieces of nineteenth

century legislation were at least partially, if not exclusively,
designed to assist actual victims of slavery.1 9 I am referring to the
fact that we know, with as much certainty as such matters ever permit, that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not think
"equal protection of the laws" made all racial distinctions in law
unconstitutional; they did not intend, for example, to outlaw racially
segregated public schools.' 0 It involves quite a stretch, then, to take
their original intentions as an argument that all race-specific distinctions, even those designed to facilitate practical equality, are either
automatically or presumptively unconstitutional.

IV.
The necessary response of the race neutralists is, of course, that
1
the Supreme Court was right in Brown v. Board of Education2
and that the 1954 Court saw the "original intention" more clearly
than its 1896 predecessor, when Brown rightly held that all official
distinctions by race are presumptively unconstitutional. But did it

so hold? That is only the most sweeping and "activist" of at least
several equally plausible readings of Brown. I will focus upon two

such readings, identified as "Brown-A" and "Brown-B."
Brown-A says that, more than a century after the Civil War, all
17. E.g., Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93
YALE L.J. 995, 997 (1984) ("History faithfully records that the purpose of the [Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments was to end forever a system which
determined legal rights, measured status, and allocated opportunities on the basis of
race, and to erect in its place a regime of race neutrality."). Compare Bork, Original
Intent and the Constitution,7 HuMANITIEs 22 (1986) with Tribe, The Holy Grail of
Original Intent, id. at 23.
18. See Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 761, 772-73 (1985) (in practice, under the
1865 Act, most of the Bureau's programs applied only to black freedmen; in addition,
the 1866 Act contained explictly race-conscious measures).
19. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1415, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
20. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REv. 1, 56 (1955).
21. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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race distinctions must now be banned as inherently "unequal;" in
light of modern and more enlightened "values," courts must create a
general Fourteenth Amendment right never to be disadvantaged by
law on account of one's race, even if this is a right the Fourteenth
Amendment's authors would not have endorsed.2 '
Brown-B says the Fourteenth Amendment's command of "equal
protection of the laws" was always intended, at its most basic level, to
ban the use of law to subjugate a racial group; we now see, as the 1896
Court did not, that racial segregation by law in public schools and
other public facilities in fact subjugated blacks, despite its appearance
of symmetry and equality, because it stood for white supremacy and
therefore denied the minority "equal protection." Thus we are creating no new basic right the Fourteenth Amendment's authors would
have rejected; it is not the law that
has changed but only our relevant
23
perceptions and understandings.
On the face of it, Brown-B seems a more modest, less radical
and less strained interpretation than Brown-A. Especially when a
national, state or local representative body adopts an affirmative action program fully consistent with Brown-B, striking that program
down as a violation of Brown-A seems hard to square with judicial
deference to political majorities absent a textually or historically
clear constitutional prohibition.24
The difficulty deepens when instrumental reasons are added to
support the race-neutral position: arguments that racism and race
resentments will be exacerbated, and racial stereotypes perpetuated,
unless we demand that government be race-blind are properly ad22. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 17, at 997-98 ("The [Brown] Court acknowledged with eloquent simplicity that the Equal Protection Clause requires governmental race neutrality in all public activities."); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 783 (1979) ("during the
two years following Brown . . . a line of per curiam decisions appeared ... to enact
Harlan's view that the Civil War Amendments altogether 'removed the race line from
out governmental systems' ") (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Van Alstyne, supra, at 790-91 ("from 1954 to 1974, the Supreme Court's unambiguous 'lesson' . . . seemed to be that race was ... constitutionally withdrawn from
the incorrigible temptations of governmental use"); A BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132-34 (1975); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 25.
23. After I delivered this address and before the discussion which followed, William Bradford Reynolds, the Assistant Attorney General of the United States in
charge of the Civil Rights Division, who was presenting an opposing view, announced
that the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant expressly and powerfully endorsed the
Reagan Administration's embrace of Brown-A. At the time - and more than slightly
on the spot - I responded that I felt a bit like the poor moviegoer in Woody Allen's
"Annie Hall" but commented that, until I had had a chance to read the Court's Wygant opinion, I could not be certain that Mr. Reynolds had indeed, like Woody Allen,
pulled his own Marshall McLuhan out of the air to refute me. Having now read the
Wygant opinions, I am relieved to report that no Marshall McLuhan has been
produced.
24. Cf. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 171 (1980) ("Whether or not it is
more blessed [for white majorities] to give than to receive, it is surely less
suspicious.").
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dressed to political bodies. For if government's actions violate no
constitutional command, why are not arguments about their longterm effects best left to the political process?
VI.
I can think of only one constitutional command that the race
neutralists might invoke to fill this gap and justify their choice of
Brown-A: a command that law and government must not restrict
any innocent individual's "liberty," broadly enough defined to include job opportunities and the like, even when such a restriction is
justified by a desire to protect others who are equally innocent. And
to deprive someone of a benefit, or to impose a burden, merely because of that person's race (and not because of what that specific
individual did wrong) violates this command no less when the deprived individual is white than when she is black. But before anyone
gravitates to this view, let me make this observation: when the government exercises its power to single out wholly innocent individuals
by taking their "private property .. .for public use," 26 the race

neutralists do not object that only the guilty should ever have to
make such focused sacrifices. Indeed, they often endorse such property takings outside the affirmative action context - so long as the
"innocents" who have been required to make special sacrifices receive "just compensation" for their losses.2" In assessing the constitutionality and wisdom of affirmative action plans that impose similarly concrete and personalized costs on "innocent" white
individuals -

losses of seniority, for example -

facing questions of

27

just compensation would offer the race neutralists a more moderate alternative to the extremism of Brown-A.
VII.
So I end with a genuine puzzle: the race neutralists do not in
fact put themselves forward, in other respects, as constitutional
radicals. First, they purport to respect the historical intentions of
the Framers, insofar as those intentions are knowable. Second, they
regard basic constitutional norms as alterable only by constitutional
amendment, and not by act of judicial improvization. Third, they
advocate deference to political majorities when a constitutional pro25. U.S. CONST.
LAW 458-65 (1978).

amend. V. See generally L.

TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 463-65;
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Vulcan Pioneers v. N.J. Dep't of Civil Service, 588 F. Supp. 716,
vacated, 588 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1984).
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hibition is at best arguable rather than clear. And fourth, they are
reluctant to have courts fashion new rights by generalizing, even
with the help of the Ninth Amendment, beyond the Constitution's
text. Yet on all four of these dimensions, the race neutralists - the
constitutional opponents of affirmative action - seem to look the
other way.
What has yet to be produced, then, is a cogent explanation of
why judicial modesty and constitutional strict construction25 should
be abandoned when the subject is affirmative action for racial
minorities.5 9

28. Although I have often criticized a knee-jerk preference for judicial passivity
and for a "narrow" reading of open-textured constitutional phrases, I have repeatedly
rejected the view that judges purporting to enforce federal constitutional norms need
not regard themselves as bound by the Constitution's text, structure and history, but
should instead feel free to impose their own political, moral or even legal philosophy
upon the more representative branches. My opposition to most of the extant theories
of the judicial role - theories that purport to remove doubts about the legitimacy of
judicial activism but only within the boundaries offered by their theoretical constraints - has indeed been based largely upon a conviction that such theories, far
from limiting courts to a non-controvertible sphere suitable to their institutional
place, have the effect of creating an illusion that judges are merely enforcing the will
of others and therefore need be less cautious about the necessarily contestible propositions that they enunciate. See generally L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES viiviii, 3-20, 267-68 (1985).
29. In posing this puzzle, I have not speculated about the motives of those opponents of affirmative action I have dubbed the race neutralists. For an account of
the importance of carrying the inquiry to that level, see Kennedy, Persuasionand
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 133741 (1986).

